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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TAPE RECORDED EVIDENCE
PRODUCED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS UNDER TITLE
III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1968
To control the growth of organized crime, Congress enacted the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Crime Control Act).'
In enacting the Crime Control Act, Congress determined that one method
to limit the growth of organized crime was to authorize law enforcement
officials and private individuals to record conversations between organized
crime members. 2 Congress thought that tape recordings of organized crime
members' conversations would produce valuable evidence that would allow
law enforcement officials effectively to identify and prosecute organized
crime members.3 Accordingly, Congress enacted Title III of the Crime
1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-2520
(1982)(Crime Control Act); see S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEws 2112, 2157 [hereinafter Senate Report](discussing Congress'
rationale for controlling growth of crime by allowing individuals to tape record conversations
under limited circumstances). By analyzing statistics, Congress concluded that organized crime
posed a threat to society and recognized the need to control the growth of organized crime.
Senate Report, supra, at 2157-58. In 1967 organized crime received $7 billion from supporting
professional gambling organizations. Id. at 2157. In addition, organized crime received a
substantial portion of the $350 million spent on narcotics each year. Id. Organized crime also
received as much as $350 million each year from illegal lending activities. Id. at 2158. Currently,
organized crime affects the operation of many legitimate businesses including night clubs, food
wholesaling, and record manufacturing. Id.
In considering the need to legislate a method for detecting organized criminal activities,
Congress also discussed the history of organized crime in the United States. Id. at 2157.
Congress noted that law enforcement officials in the nation's early years were able to identify
and prosecute people who committed crimes because law enforcement officials personally knew
the members of the community as a result of the nation's small size. Id. Law enforcement
officials, therefore, did not consider the existence of organized crime members in developing
methods to apprehend and prosecute criminals. Id. As the nation grew in size, the need for
new methods for apprehending criminals increased because law enforcement officials no longer
knew each member of the community. Id. Congress concluded that law enforcement officials
in the 1960's could not detect and control organized crime because of the nation's increasing
population. Id.
2. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2159-61 (recognizing use of electronic surveillance
as means to aid law enforcement in combatting organized crime). Congress recognized that
law enforcement officials could not detect organized crime in the late 1960's because organized
crime was less visible, more secretive, and, therefore, more difficult to detect than other types
of crime. Id. at 2158. Congress also recognized that law enforcement officials had difficulty
detecting organized criminal activities because witnesses and victims of organized crime would
not testify out of fear that organized crime members might seek vengeance. Id. at 2159, 2160.
The problem of identifying organized crime members was compounded because many people
at lower levels in the organized crime hierarchy protected top figures of organized crime, and
top figures frequently did not participate in the direct activities of organized crime. Id. at
2159.
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' opinion that allowing
law enforcement officials to record conversations of organized crime members is effective in
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Control Act (Title III) to authorize law enforcement officials and private
individuals to record conversations between organized crime members.
4
In enacting Title III, however, Congress recognized that permitting law
enforcement officials and private individuals to record conversations sub-
stantially could invade a person's privacy.5 In balancing Congress' interests
in protecting privacy against Congress' desire to control the growth of
organized crime, Congress decided to permit law enforcement officials and
private individuals to record organized crime members' conversations only
within certain limitations.6 Under Title III law enforcement officials may
record a conversation only after a federal judge has reviewed and authorized
an application for taping conversations made by a law enforcement official.
7
detecting activities of organized crime members). Because many organized crime members live
in every part of the country, the telephone is often the easiest and most secret manner to plan
criminal activities. See M. Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law
of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. oF Ciam. LAW & CRUMNOLOGY 36 (1983) (discussing organized
crime members' use of telephones to conduct and plan criminal activities). As a result of
organized crime members' use of the telephone to plan criminal activities, Congress reasoned
that giving law enforcement officials the ability to record organized crime members' telephone
conversations would help courts identify and prosecute organized crime members. See Senate
Report, supra note 1, at 2159-61 (discussing congressional rationale for allowing individuals
to record organized crime members' conversations).
4. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2157 (discussing Congress' rationale for enacting
Title III).
5. See id., at 2154-56 (discussing Congress' concern for protecting individuals' privacy
from indiscriminate electronic surveillance). Congress recognized that technological develop-
ments have enabled individuals to violate other persons' privacy by abuse and vast usage of
tape recorded surveillance. Id.
6. See id., at 2156-57 (Congress reconciled protecting privacy with combatting organized
crime in enacting Title III by establishing strict guidelines for individuals who tape record
conversations). Congress reasoned that only minimal violations of privacy would exist if
Congress established uniform guidelines for individuals to follow in taping conversations. Id.
at 2156.
7. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-19 (1982) (here-
inafter Title III). To obtain an authorization to record conversations, law enforcement officials
must follow procedural guidelines. Id. at § 2518. A law enforcement official first must complete
and submit an application for recording conversations to the attorney general. Id. at § 2516.
The attorney general then may authorize the law enforcement official to give the application
for recording conversations to a federal judge. Id. The federal judge may authorize a
surveillance only if the tape recorded conversations may produce evidence of a felony or of
certain other crimes. Id.; see Griffin-Landrum Labor Reform Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1954)
(listing crimes that federal judge will consider in issuing authorization). A judge may issue the
order only if the judge determines from the application that probable cause of criminal activity
exists, and that the subject of the taping has committed or is committing an offense listed in
Title III. Title III, supra, at § 2518; see Title III, supra, at § 2516 (listing crimes judge
considers in issuing authorization).
When a law enforcement official applies for a judicial authorization, the application must
include the identity of the law enforcement officer, as well as a complete statement of the
facts and circumstances of the suspected crime. See Title III, supra, at § 2518. The application
for a judicial order also must show whether the law enforcement official has considered other
types of investigation to uncover evidence of the suspected crime. Id. If law enforcement
officials have considered other types of investigation, the application must explain why the
TAPE RECORDED EVIDENCE
Similarly, under Title III a private individual may record conversations only
if the individual is a party to the conversation or if the individual has
received consent from a party to the conversation to make the recording.8
Congress further limited a private individual's right to record conver-
sations by enacting the criminal purpose exception to Title III [hereinafter
referred to as the criminal purpose exception]. 9 In creating the criminal
purpose exception, Congress prohibited the introduction of tape recorded
evidence in any court if an individual made the tape recording for a criminal
purpose.' 0 Although little legislative history exists to reveal Congress' intent
in enacting the criminal purpose exception, Congress stated that a private
individual acts with a criminal purpose if the individual intends to injure
or offend a party to the conversation who has not consented to the recording
[hereinafter referred to as the non-consenting party]." Congress noted that
without the criminal purpose exception to Title III, private individuals
legally could record a conversation intending to injure the non-consenting
party through means like blackmailing or stealing business secrets.' 2 Al-
other investigations have not succeeded. Id. After reviewing the application, the judge may
enter an order accepting or modifying the application. Id. In addition to issuing an order, a
federal judge may also request law enforcement officials to file progress reports concerning
the taping of conversations. Id.
8. See Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511 (stating that private individual may record
conversations if individual is party to taped conversation or if one party to conversation
consents to recording).
9. Id. at § 2511(2)(d) (stating that private individuals may not tape conversations for
criminal purposes). As originally proposed, Title III would permit private individuals to record
conversations for any illicit purpose, including blackmailing a party to the conversation who
did not consent to the recording [hereinafter non-consenting party], threatening the non-
consenting party, or publicly embarrassing the non-consenting party. See 114 CONG. REc.
14,694-95 (1968) (reporting congressional debate concerning originally proposed Title III). By
enacting the criminal purpose exception, Congress sought to deter individuals from recording
conversations for the purpose of injuring the non-consenting party. Id. The language of the
criminal purpose exception provision is as follows: tape recorded evidence is admissi-
ble..". . .unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal
or tortious act. . ." Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d).
10. See Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (stating that making tapes for criminal
purpose violates Title III); id. at § 2515 (stating that tape recordings that violate Title III are
inadmissible as evidence in any court).
11. 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1968) (discussing rationale for enacting criminal purpose
exception). Congress recognized that unrestricted electronic surveillance would allow private
individuals to tape conversations to injure persons not consenting to the recordings. Id. In
enacting the criminal purpose exception, Congress reasoned that a person intending to injure
a non-consenting individual with tape recorded evidence acts with a criminal purpose. Id.; see
supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purpose in amending Title III to
deter private individuals from recording conversations intending to injure non-consenting parties
with tape recorded evidence).
12. See supra note 9'and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purpose in enacting
criminal purpose exception). Crimes falling under the criminal purpose exception include any
crime if an element of intent for the crime is to injure a non-consenting party to the
conversation. See 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1968) (discussing Congress' rationale for enacting
criminal purpose exception).
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though Congress did not attempt to define thoroughly the criminal purpose
exception, Congress nonetheless concluded that Title III should not permit
a person to make recordings for a criminal purpose because the recordings
seriously could invade a non-consenting party's privacy. 13 As a result of
Congress' failure to define the criminal purpose exception thoroughly, the
criminal purpose exception has created confusion for federal circuit courts
attempting to interpret and apply the exception.' 4 In recent decisions, circuit
courts have raised three questions about the criminal 'purpose exception. 5
First, circuit courts have attempted to ascertain what type of injury a private
individual must intend to inflict upon the non-consenting party to constitute
a criminal purpose.' 6 Second, circuit courts have attempted to determine
whether the criminal purpose exception applies to a private individual who
makes recordings as well as to non-consenting parties. 17 Finally, circuit
courts have considered whether the criminal purpose exception applies to a
private individual who has recorded conversations for many different pur-
poses.' 8 In attempting to eliminate the confusion and ambiguity of the
criminal purpose exception, courts have attempted to answer these ques-
tions. 19
13. 114 CoNG. Rc. 14,694-95 (1968) (discussing violations of privacy by person recording
conversations intending to injure non-cdnsenting party with recorded evidence); see Title III,
supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (establishing criminal purpose exception); supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress' rationale for amending Title III to include criminal
purpose exception).
14. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 107-111 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing
Congress' intended meaning and application of criminal purpose exception), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 2484 (1987); United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 903-05 (discussing application of
criminal purpose exception to situations involving persons who tape record conversations for
many purposes), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text
(discussing Sixth Circuit's difficulty in interpreting and applying criminal purpose exception);
infra notes 83-117 and accompanying text (discussing Vest court's difficulty in applying criminal
purpose exception to circumstances involving person recording conversations for many different
purposes).
15. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing three questions about
criminal purpose exception circuit courts recently have raised).
16. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F. 2d 105, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing
difficulty with interpreting criminal purpose exception), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987);
United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902-905 (D. Mass 1986) (court discusses meaning of
criminal purpose), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); infra notes 53-66 and accompanying
text (discussing Sixth Circuit's difficulty in interpreting criminal purpose exception and Con-
gress' intent in enacting criminal purpose exception).
17. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing whether
to apply criminal purpose exception to persons who tape record conversations for criminal
purposes), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987); infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Underhill court's difficulty in applying exception to both private individuals who
record conversations for criminal purposes and non-consenting parties).
18. See United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 904-05 (D. Mass. 1986) (discussing
methods for determining criminal purpose when individuals record conversations for many
different purposes), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (Ist Cir. 1987); infra notes 84-117 and accompanying
text (discussing Vest court's difficulty in applying criminal purpose exception when individuals
record conversations for many different purposes).
19. See supra notes 16-18 (discussing circuit courts that address questions attempting to
apply criminal purpose exception properly).
TAPE RECORDED EVIDENCE
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
interpreted and applied the criminal purpose exception in United States v.
Underhill.2 In Underhill federal agents searched an apartment leased by
Daniel Rokitka for evidence of illegal gambling. 2' The agents discovered
gambling paraphernalia and saw two telephones attached to tape recorders.22
The agents found and seized fifteen audio cassettes. 23 The cassettes contained
conversations concerning exchanges of gambling information and the placing
of bets on sporting events. 24 At an evidentiary hearing, the government
attempted to introduce the tapes as evidence against Rokitka and Howard
Underhill, the persons who had recorded the conversations.2 The govern-
ment also tried to use the recordings against Walter Person, Pat Tata, Tony
Rayburn, and Eddie and Joe Osborne, the defendants that Underhill and
Rokitka had recorded secretly.? A federal grand jury in the Western District
of Tennessee indicted all of the defendants for conspiracy and other offenses
relating to the ownership and operation of an illegal gambling operation.27
In the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
Underhill and Rokitka testified that they had recorded conversations to
retain a record to settle disputes over gambling wagers. 28 Recognizing that
making gambling records is a misdemeanor in Tennessee,29 the defendants
argued that the court should exclude the tape recordings under the criminal
purpose exception. 0 In response to the defendants' contention that the
district court should not admit the tapes as evidence, the government argued
that in enacting Title III, Congress never intended to prevent courts from
20. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987).
21. United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 107 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 2484 (1987).






28. Id. at 110.
29. Id. at 111; see TENN. CODE Am. §§ 39-6-601(7), 39-6-602(e) (1980) (prohibiting
production and possession of gambling records). To knowingly make, possess or store gambling
records is a misdemeanor in Tennessee. See TENN. CODE ANN. at §§ 39-6-601(7), 39-6-602(e).
30. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108-09. In Underhill the defendants that did not consent to
the taping of the conversations argued that criminal purpose is equivalent to the intent to
commit any criminal act. Id. The non-consenting defendants showed that defendants Underhill
and Rokitka had committed a crime under Tennessee law. Id. Accordingly, the defendants
argued that Rokitka and Underhill recorded conversations for a criminal purpose. Id. In
contending that defendants Underhill and Rokitka recorded the conversations for a criminal
purpose, the remaining defendants argued that the court should exclude the tape recordings
under the criminal purpose exception of Title III. Id; see Title III, supra note 7, at §2511(2)(d)
(stating that tapes made for criminal purpose violate provisions of Title III); supra note 10
and accompanying text (stating that evidence produced by violating Title III is inadmissible as
evidence in court); supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing that person who makes
gambling records violates Tennessee law).
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using evidence against organized crime members. 3' The government reasoned
that excluding recordings under the criminal purpose exception would cir-
cumvent Congress' purpose of combatting organized crime.3 2 The govern-
ment also argued that Underhill and Rokitka had not made the recordings
with a criminal purpose.3 3 The government reasoned that the defendants
had made the tapes intending to maintain records of gambling bets but not
intending to injure the non-consenting defendants 4 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment reasoned that Congress did not intend for the criminal purpose
exception to encompass all crime, but only certain crimes, such as blackmail,
that involve a private individual who intends to injure a non-consenting
party.3 5 Consequently, the government argued that the tapes were admissible
as evidence against the defendants.3 The district court disagreed with the
government's arguments and excluded the tape recordings as evidence against
the defendants.3 7 The government appealed the district court's decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
38
The Sixth Circuit in Underhill first considered whether defendants
Underhill and Rokitka had made the tapes for a criminal purpose. 39 In
considering whether to exclude the recordings under the criminal purpose
exception of Title III, the Sixth Circuit recognized that to make or possess
gambling records is a crime in Tennessee.40 Relying on the defendants'
testimony that the tapes were records of gambling transactions, the Sixth
Circuit held that Underhill and Rokitka had made the tapes for a criminal
purpose.
4'
31. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 109. In arguing that the court should admit the tapes into
evidence against the defendants, the government in Underhill stated that Congress' primary
purpose in enacting Title III was to control the growth of organized crime. Id.; see supra note
1 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to combat organized crime in enacting
Crime Control Act). The government argued, therefore, that Congress did not intend to protect
organized crime members with the criminal purpose exception. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 109.
32. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 109-10; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
government's argument that excluding tapes as evidence would circumvent purpose of Crime
Control Act).
33. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 109-10.
34. Id. (discussing defendants' testimony that purpose of recordings was to make gam-
bling records).
35. Id.; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in
enacting criminal purpose exception); see also supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text
(discussing crimes falling under criminal purpose exception).
36. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 110; see Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (stating that
tape recordings made for criminal purpose are inadmissible as evidence). Under Title III courts
may admit a tape recording against any defendant if the individual made the recording without
a criminal purpose. See Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (criminal purpose exception).
37. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108 (discussing district court excluding evidence because court
held intent to commit criminal act equivalent to criminal purpose under criminal purpose
exception).
38. Id. at 107.
39. Id. at 110-11.
40. Id. at 111; see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing Tennessee
statutory prohibition against making and possessing gambling records).
41. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111. The Sixth Circuit in Underhill reasoned that intent to
TAPE RECORDED EVIDENCE
After determining that Underhill and Rokitka had made tapes for a
criminal purpose, the Sixth Circuit next considered whether to apply the
criminal purpose exception to the tape recordings as evidence against Un-
derhill and Rokitka, the defendants who recorded the conversations.4 2 In
considering whether the criminal purpose exception applied to Underhill
and Rokitka, the Sixth Circuit examined the legislative history of Title III.
4
1
The Underhill court recognized that although Congress had intended to
permit private individuals to tape conversations, Congress also intended to
protect the privacy of individuals by restricting the use of tape recorded
conversations."4 In concluding that Congress had enacted the criminal pur-
pose exception only to protect the privacy of persons who did not record
conversations, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress did not enact the
exception to protect the privacy of private individuals who made recordings.
4 5
The Sixth Circuit determined, therefore, that the government could admit
the recordings against Underhill and Rokitka, even if Underhill and Rokitka
made the tapes with the criminal purpose of recording gambling transac-
tions.
46
Finally, the Sixth Circuit considered whether to exclude the tape re-
cordings as evidence against the defendants who did not consent to the tape
recordings.4 7 In determining the admissibility of the tapes against Person,
Tata, Rayburn, and Eddie and Joe Osborne, the Sixth Circuit examined
the relationship between Underhill and Rokitka and the remaining defen-
dants.4 8 The court determined that even though the remaining defendants
did not consent to the recordings, the remaining defendants were co-
commit a crime constitutes a criminal purpose under Title III. Id. at 110-11; cf. Title III,
supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (criminal purpose exception).
42. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111-12.
43. Id.; see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2153-97 (legislative history of Title III).
44. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' concern for protecting non-consenting parties from invasions of privacy); supra
notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to protect non-consenting parties'
privacy by enacting criminal purpose exception).
45. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112. In Underhill the Sixth Circuit concluded that in enacting
Title III, Congress intended to prohibit a perpetrator from benefiting from the perpetrator's
unlawful acts. Id.; see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2156 (reporting legislative history stating
that perpetrators must not benefit from illegal acts). The Sixth Circuit contended that a
perpetrator is an individual who records conversations for a criminal purpose. Underhill, 813
F.2d at 112. The Sixth Circuit reasoned, therefore, that the criminal purpose exception does
not apply to persons who violate Title III by recording conversations with a criminal purpose.
Id.
46. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112; see supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Congress did not intend for criminal purpose exception to
protect persons who record conversations for criminal purposes).
47. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112; see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing
court's rationale for admitting tapes as evidence against non-consenting parties).
48. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112. The Sixth Circuit in Underhill held that defendants
Person, Tata, Rayburn and Eddie and Joe Osborne conspired with Underhill and Rokitka to
maintain an illegal gambling operation. Id.
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conspirators of Underhill and Rokitka. 49 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that,
as co-conspirators, the remaining defendants had waived any claim to
invasion of privacy and were bound by the acts of the conspirators who
had recorded the conversations.5 0 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the re-
maining defendants were as responsible as Underhill and Rokitka for the
existence of the tape recordings.5 ' Consequently, the Sixth Circuit admitted
the tapes as evidence against the remaining defendants, holding that the
criminal purpose exception did not apply to co-conspirators.12
The Sixth Circuit in Underhill raised the question of what type of intent
demonstrates that a person recorded a conversation for a criminal purpose."
The Underhill court answered the question by concluding that Congress
intended for any criminal intent to constitute a criminal purpose.5 4 The
Sixth Circuit reasoned that intending to commit a criminal act is equivalent
to acting with a criminal purpose under Title III.5 In determining whether
Underhill and Rokitka had recorded the conversations with a criminal
purpose, however, the Sixth Circuit mistakenly focused on the fact that
Underhill and Rokitka committed a crime by making gambling records
rather than focusing on whether Underhill and Rokitka made the gambling





53. Id. at 111-12 (Sixth Circuit's interpretation of meaning of criminal purpose); see
supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's analysis of criminal purpose
exception).
54. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 110-111 (court reasons that criminal purpose is equivalent to
any criminal intent); see infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (discussing correct interpre-
tation of criminal purpose).
55. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111; see infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing
Sixth Circuit's incorrect interpretation of criminal purpose).
56. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 110-11 (discussing Sixth Circuit's rationale for holding
that defendants made tapes for criminal purpose). In Underhill the Sixth Circuit equated the
intent to commit a criminal act with criminal purpose. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that Underhill
and Rokitka taped with a criminal purpose because Rokitka and Underhill violated Tennessee
law by making gambling records. Id.; see United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 480 (Ist Cir.
1987) (district court held that criminal purpose is intent to injure non-consenting party to
conversation, including crimes such as blackmail); Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 798 (8th
Cir. 1971) (holding that criminal purpose exception does not apply to all crimes because
criminal purpose is intent to injure taped subject); 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1968) (stating
that criminal purpose exception applies to crime if person commits crime by intending to injure
non-consenting party). In Meredith plaintiff allegedly suffered a hip injury. 446 F.2d at 796.
Plaintiff claimed that the injury occurred during employment. Id. The defendant, Gavin, was
the claims manager for the insurance carrier for plaintiffs employer. Id. The insurance carrier
did not pay for the injury, arguing that the plaintiff's alleged injury did not occur during a
work-related activity. Id. The insurance carrier based the refusal to pay on a written statement
by the plaintiff. Id. The statement suggested that the injury occurred from ordinary lifting
strain, and the insurance carrier concluded that the plaintiff's injury was not compensable.
Id. On one occasion plaintiff telephoned Gavin to ask why the carrier had not paid the injury
TAPE RECORDED EVIDENCE
The Sixth Circuit incorrectly interpreted and applied the criminal pur-
pose exception perhaps because of the paucity of legislative history and
congressional guidance concerning the criminal purpose exception. 57 The
criminal purpose exception has little legislative history because Congress did
not include the exception within the originally proposed version of Title
III.58 Under the originally proposed version of Title III, Congress permitted
private individuals to record conversations without restriction. 59 Congress,
however, thought that the original provisions of Title III would permit
private individuals to make recordings to injure non-consenting parties. 60
Therefore, Congress amended the originally proposed version of Title III
by enacting the criminal purpose exception. 6' 'Congress designed the criminal
claim. Id. Gavin recorded the conversation without the plaintiff's consent. Id. During the
conversation, Gavin read the written statement to the plaintiff. Id. Gavin claimed he routinely
recorded conversations to keep accurate records of any conversations he made with claimants.
Id. The plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim alleging that the plaintiff slipped on a
floor littered with debris at his place of employment. Id. During the hearing, the plaintiff
denied having the taped conversation with Gavin. Id. Gavin testified at the hearing that after
Gavin read a transcript of the taped conversation to the plaintiff, the plaintiff responded that
the plaintiff did make the written statement. Id. Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
alleging that the use of the recording at the worker's compensation hearing violated Title III.
Id. at 797.
In addressing the plaintiff's contention, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recognized that Congress enacted the criminal purpose exception after Congress initially
considered Title III. Id. at 798. The Eighth Circuit noted that the criminal purpose exception
prohibited a person from making any recordings of conversations with the intent to injure a
non-consenting party. Id.; see 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1968) (discussing criminal purpose
exception applying if person commits crime intending to injure non-consenting party). In the
context of the statute, the Eighth Circuit determined that, in enacting the criminal purpose
exception, Congress contemplated conduct in which a person records conversations with the
intent to use the recordings against the non-consenting party in an offensive manner. Meredith,
446 F.2d at 799. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the criminal purpose exception does not
apply to all criminal acts because a criminal purpose under Title III is the intent to injure a
non-consenting party. Id. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that Gavin did not make the
tape recording for a criminal purpose because Gavin did not intend to injure or offend anyone
with the tape recording. Id.
57. See Meredith, 446 F.2d at 798 (recognizing lack of legislative history about meaning
of criminal purpose exception); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2182 (demonstrating that
Congress did not mention criminal purpose exception in early legislative history of Title III).
58. See Meredith, 813 F.2d at 797-798 (discussing legislative history of criminal purpose
exception); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2182 (legislative history of originally proposed
Title III does not contain criminal purpose exception); Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d)
(criminal purpose exception as enacted by Congress).
59. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing proposed provision including
criminal purpose exception); 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Aoxw. NEws, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2236
(1968)(discussing provision as originally proposed). The sponsors of the criminal purpose
exception objected to Title III as originally proposed because the act would permit persons to
tape record conversations for any injurious purpose. Id.
60. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' fear that proposed
version of Title III would authorize persons to injure taped subjects).
61. See Meredith, 813 F.2d at 798 (discussing Congress' rationale for enacting criminal
purpose exception); supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's analysis
of Congress' intent in enacting criminal purpose exception); supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting criminal purpose exception).
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purpose exception to protect non-consenting parties from private individuals
who record conversations intending to injure non-consenting parties with
the evidence produced by the recordings.62 Congress intended the criminal
purpose exception to apply to a crime if the private individual secretly
intended to injure a party to the conversation by committing a crime such
as blackmail.63 If a private individual secretly records a conversation while
intending to commit a crime by injuring a non-consenting party with the
recorded evidence, then the crime falls under the criminal purpose excep-
tionA4 If the private individual records the conversations intending to commit
a crime but not intending to injure a party with the recorded evidence, then
the crime does not fall under the criminal purpose exception.65 Therefore,
in amending Title III to include the criminal purpose exception, Congress
intended for courts to exclude tape recordings as evidence against non-
consenting parties only if a private individual made the recordings with the
intent to injure a non-consenting party.
66
After considering Congress' intent in enacting the criminal purpose
exception, the Sixth Circuit in Underhill raised the issue of whether the
criminal purpose exception applies to tape recorded evidence used against
a private individual who made the recordings.6 7 The Sixth Circuit properly
admitted the tapes against the defendants who recorded the conversations
because Congress never intended to protect persons who make tape record-
62. See Meredith, 446 F.2d at 799 (court discusses Congress' intent in enacting criminal
purpose exception); United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 905-907 (D. Mass. 1986) (crime
with intent to injure non-consenting parties falls under criminal purpose exception which
include crimes like blackmail), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95
(1968) (discussing meaning of criminal purpose).
63. See Meredith, 446 F.2d at 799 (discussing crimes falling under criminal purpose
exception); Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 907 (discussing blackmail as crime falling under criminal
purpose exception); 114 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1968) (stating that crimes falling under criminal
purpose exception have elements of intent to injure non-consenting parties); supra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing crimes Congress intended to fall under criminal purpose excep-
tion).
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing criminal acts falling under
criminal purpose exception).
65. Id.
66. Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (criminal purpose provision); see Meredith,
446 F.2d at 799 (discussing Congress' intent in enacting criminal purpose exception); Vest, 639
F. Supp at 907 (stating that person acts with criminal purpose when intending to injure a non-
consenting party); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to protect
non-consenting parties by enacting criminal purpose exception); supra note 56 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Congress' purpose in enacting criminal purpose exception); supra note
63 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to protect non-consenting parties rather
than persons who record conversations for criminal purposes).
67. United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing difficulty
in determining whether to admit tapes against person who recorded conversations under
criminal purpose exception), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987); supra notes 40-46 and
accompanying text (discussing court's difficulty in determining whether to admit tapes as
evidence against persons making tapes).
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ings.65 A careful analysis of the legislative history of the criminal purpose
exception under Title III reveals that Congress did not intend for the
criminal purpose exception to apply to private individuals who have recorded
conversations. 69 According to the legislative history of Title III, Congress
intended to authorize courts to permit the government to admit tape recorded
evidence against the maker of the tape. 70 Congress reasoned that allowing
the government to use and disclose tape recorded evidence is necessary to
investigate and prosecute persons who record conversations for criminal
purposes.
71
Courts would support Congress' purpose in combatting organized crime
by admitting the tape recordings against a private individual who records
conversations to produce evidence of the individual's organized crime activ-
ities.7 2 By admitting tape recorded evidence against an individual who records
a conversation for a criminal purpose, courts would not interfere with
Congress' desire to prevent invasions of a person's privacy.73 In addition
to admitting tape recordings against the persons who record conversations
68. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent not to
protect persons making tapes with criminal purpose exception).
69. See Senate Report, supra note I, at 2156 (discussing Congress' intent not to apply
criminal purpose exception to persons making recordings for criminal purposes); infra note 74
and accompanying text (legislative history reveals that Congress intended to admit tapes against
person who makes tapes).
70. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (analyzing legislative history regarding decision to
admit tapes against persons making tapes); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2156 (discussing
Congress' intent to deny protection to persons recording conversations under criminal purpose
exception). The legislative history of Title III reveals that Congress intended to deny individuals
who record conversations for criminal purposes to benefit from the fruits of the individuals'
illegal activities. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2156. Congress, therefore, did not intend
for courts to shield persons making illegal tape recordings by excluding tape recorded evidence
under the criminal purpose exception. Id. Congress allowed the government to use and disclose
the tape recordings against a person making the tape recordings in order to investigate and
prosecute the person making the tapes. Id. at 2188.
71. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2188 (discussing Congress' determination that
admitting tape recorded evidence is crucial to prosecution of persons who record conversations
for criminal purposes).
72. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (court admitted tape recordings against persons
making tapes which produced evidence of involvement with illegal gambling operation); supra
note I and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to control growth of organized
crime by enacting Title III); Senate Report, supra note I, at 2188 (stating that admitting tape
recorded evidence against persons who record for criminal purposes is necessary to investigate
and decrease organized criminal activity).
73. See Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (discussing enactment of
criminal purpose exception to protect taped subjects from injurious invasions of privacy);
CoNG. Rzc., supra note 9, at 14,694-95 (discussing Congress' intent to protect non-consenting
parties by enacting criminal purpose exception); supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' desire to protect non-consenting parties from invasions of privacy); suprd note 9
and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to protect persons from invasions of
privacy by enacting criminal purpose exception); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2154-2156
(discussing Congress' desire to protect individuals' privacy from persons who record conver-
sations for criminal purposes).
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for a criminal purpose, a court's threat of prosecuting the individuals for
organized criminal activities would deter individuals from making recordings
to injure or offend a non-consenting party.
74
Finally, courts should admit recordings as evidence against private
individuals who record conversations according to Congress' intended mean-
ing of the criminal purpose exception. 75 Congress designed the criminal
purpose exception to protect a non-consenting party from a private individ-
ual who tape records conversations intending to injure the non-consenting
party with the tape recorded evidence.7 6 The criminal purpose exception,
however, does not apply to a tape recording if a party to the conversation
consents to the recording.7 7 A private individual who is also a party to the
conversation arguably consents to the recording of the conversation by
recording the conversation.7 8 As a result of Congress' intent to protect only
a non-consenting party to a conversation, Congress did not intend for the
criminal purpose exception to protect the interests of a private individual
who recorded the conversation for a criminal purpose. 79 Therefore, under
74. See CoNo. Rac., supra note 9, at 14694-95 (discussing Congress' intent in enacting
criminal purpose exception to exclude evidence used against non-consenting parties); Senate
Report, supra note 1, at 2156 (discussing Congress' intent to admit tapes against maker of
tapes because criminal purpose exception gives no protection to persons recording conversations
in violation of Title III). A person who makes tapes for a criminal purpose violates Title III.
See Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (discussing criminal purpose exception as violation
of Title III). Courts must deny protection under the criminal purpose exception to a person
who violates Title III by recording conversations for a criminal purpose. See Senate Report,
supra note I, at 2156.
75. See Meredith, 446 F.2d at 798 (discussing enactment of criminal purpose exception
to protect non-consenting parties from injurious invasions of privacy); CONG. REc., supra note
9, at 14,694-95 (stating that criminal purpose is intent to injure or offend non-consenting
parties with tape recorded evidence); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent in enacting criminal purpose exception).
76. See CONG. REc., supra note 9, at 14,694-95 (discussing criminal purpose exception
as protection for non-consenting parties). In enacting the criminal purpose exception, Congress
intended to protect the privacy of non-consenting parties. Id.
77. Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (Congress specified under criminal purpose
exception provision that exception does not apply to tape recorded evidence when party to
conversation consents to recording).
78. See Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (criminal purpose exception provision).
The criminal purpose exception does not apply to tape recorded evidence if persons give
consent to individuals to record conversations or know that an individual is recording a
conversation. Id. An individual who is a party to the conversation, while recording the
conversation, knows that someone is recording the conversation. See id. Therefore, an individual
who records a conversation arguably consents to the recording. See id.
79. See CONG. REc., supra note 9, at 14,694-95 (discussing purpose in enacting criminal
purpose exception). Congress enacted the criminal purpose exception to protect non-consenting
parties from potential injury. Id. In Underhil the Sixth Circuit determined that the persons
making the tapes waved claims to violations of privacy because the persons making the tapes
produced the tapes. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987). The court determined that in making the tapes, the persons
had no expectation of privacy. Id.
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the criminal purpose exception, courts should admit tapes as evidence against
the person who records conversations for a criminal purpose.8 0
Although the criminal purpose exception does not apply to tape record-
ings used as evidence against persons who have recorded conversations for
a criminal purpose, the exception does apply to tape recorded evidence used
against non-consenting parties. 8' In enacting Title III, Congress reasoned
that a private individual records a conversation for a criminal purpose if
the individual intends to injure a non-consenting party to the recording.
2
Although Congress specified that Congress enacted the criminal purpose
exception to protect non-consenting parties from private individuals who
record for a criminal purpose, Congress did not indicate how courts should
determine criminal purpose when individuals record conversations for many
different purposes.8 3 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in United States v. Vest8 addressed the problem of determining
criminal purpose when an individual made tape recordings for many pur-
poses.
85
In Vest police officers arrested and charged Jesse James Waters with
shooting detective Francis J. Tarantino.16 While on bail, Waters met with
Tarantino and Vest, another detective. 7 Waters agreed to pay $300,000 to
Tarantino, and Vest agreed to collect the payments for Tarantino from
Waters. 8 In return for Waters' payments, Tarantino promised that the
Superior Court for Suffolk County, Massachusetts, would not sentence
Waters to imprisonment if Waters pled guilty to the shooting of Tarantino. 9
When Vest visited Waters to receive the first payment, Waters tape recorded
the entire conversation without Vest's knowledge.1°
80. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for admitting
tapes against persons who record conversations under criminal purpose exception).
81. See CONG. REc., supra note 9, at 14694-95 (discussing intent to protect non-consenting
parties from invasions of privacy by enacting criminal purpose exception).
82. See Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (discussing Congress'
purpose in protecting non-consenting parties by enacting criminal purpose exception); CONG.
Rac., supra note 9, at 14694-95 (discussing congressional meaning of criminal purpose); supra
note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purpose for enacting criminal purpose
exception).
83. See United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Mass. 1986) (discussing lack
of congressional guidance and legal precedent in applying criminal purpose exception), aff'd,
813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); Title III, supra note 7, at §§ 2510-20 (suggesting lack of
congressional guidance for applying criminal purpose exception when persons record conver-
sations for many purposes); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2112-97 (suggesting lack of
legislative history to reveal Congress' intended application of criminal purpose exception to
persons recording conversations for many purposes).
84. 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
85. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (Ist Cir. 1987).
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Two months after the Superior Court convicted and sentenced Waters
to imprisonment for the shooting of Tarantino, Waters turned the tape
recording of the transaction with Vest over to law enforcement officials. 9'
After law enforcement officials investigated the payoff agreement between
Tarantino, Vest and Waters, a grand jury indicted Vest. 92 Vest moved to
suppress the tape recording, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible
under the criminal purpose exception because Waters had recorded the
conversation intending to blackmail Vest.
93
In considering whether to exclude the tape recording under the criminal
purpose exception of Title III, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit adopted without comment the reasoning of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 94 The district court recog-
nized that a tape recording is inadmissible as evidence against non-consenting
parties to the taped conversation if a person recorded the conversations for
a criminal purpose. 95 The district court noted, however, that the criminal
purpose exception was difficult to apply to situations involving private
individuals who record conversations for a criminal purpose because indi-
viduals seldom act for a singular purpose.96 The district court reasoned that
persons tape conversations for many different purposes. 97 The district court
acknowledged that without congressional guidance or legal precedent, the
district court needed to construct a method for determining whether an
individual has recorded a conversation for a criminal purpose when the
individual made the recording for many different purposes. 98
In developing the method, the district court examined two approaches
for determining whether a person recorded a conversation for a criminal
purpose. 99 The first approach the court considered required a non-consenting
party to show that the person recording the conversation had some intent,




94. Id. at 480 (First Circuit affirmed district court's holding that tape recorded evidence
was inadmissible under criminal purpose exception).
95. United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477
(1st Cir. 1987); see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing language of criminal
purpose exception).
96. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 902 (discussing difficulty in applying criminal purpose exception
if person records conversations for many different purposes); supra note 9 and accompanying
text (stating that criminal purpose provision refers to single purpose).
97. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 902 (stating that persons usually tape record conversations for
many purposes).
98. Id.; see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing lack of congressional
guidance in applying criminal purpose exception when individuals record conversations for
many purposes).
99. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing court's analysis of two methods for determining
criminal purpose); infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing district court's analysis
of two methods court considered for determining criminal purpose).
100. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing district court's analysis of first method for
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district court rejected the first approach, reasoning that the first approach
unfairly would require the government to prove that the person recording
the conversations had no intent whatsoever to injure the non-consenting
party.'0 ' The second approach the court considered required the non-con-
senting party to show that the person recording the conversation intended
only to injure the non-consenting party.'02 However, the district court
rejected the second approach, reasoning that the second approach would
unfairly require the non-consenting party to prove that the person recorded
the conversation solely to injure the non-consenting party.103
In rejecting the two approaches, the district court in Vest adopted a
third method as a compromise between the two examined approaches.
1°4
The district court determined that a person records a conversation for a
criminal purpose if the person primarily intends to injure a non-consenting
party with the recording (hereinafter referred to as the primary motivation
method).'°0 The district court stated that by applying the primary motivation
method, courts could take into account the complexity of human motiva-
tion.106 The district court reasoned that the primary motivation method
weighs the purposes for which the individual made the tapes in order to
determining whether individuals record conversations for criminal purposes). The first method
analyzed by the district court would require that the government prove that the individual
recorded the conversation with no criminal purpose in order to admit the tape recordings into
evidence. Id.
101. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing court's rationale for rejecting first method in
determining whether individuals record conversations for criminal purposes). The district court
determined that the first method would place an unreasonable burden of proof upon the
government. Id.
102. Id. (discussing court's analysis of second method for determining criminal purpose).
The district court in Vest stated that to render tape recordings inadmissible under the second
method, the non-consenting party must prove that the individual made the recordings only for
a criminal purpose. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 904; see infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing method court adopts
in determining whether person tape recorded conversations for criminal purposes).
105. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing court's adoption of method to determine
whether person tape recorded conversations for criminal purpose). In Vest the district court
determined that a person records a conversation for a criminal purpose if the person primarily
intends to injure the non-consenting party with the recording (hereinafter referred to as the
primary motivation method). Id. The district court noted that courts usually use the primary
motivation method in determining whether a person has acted with the requisite intent of a
particular crime when the person has acted for many different motives. Id. at 905. Courts
often apply the primary motivation method in employment discrimination cases concerning
age, sex or race. Id.; see Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying
primary motivation test to determine whether firing of employee was based on racial discrim-
ination); United States v. Phillips, 564 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying primary motivation
test to circumstances involving public embarrassment with tape recordings); infra notes 106-
109 and accompanying text (discussing court's rationale for adopting primary motivation
method for determining criminal purpose).
106. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing court's statement that primary motivation
method would enable other courts to account for all of individual's purposes in recording
conversations).
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determine if the criminal purpose was primary. 101 The district court also
stated that the primary motivation method places a reasonable burden of
proof upon the government and the non-consenting party to show whether
the individual recorded a conversation with a criminal purpose.108 The district
court thought the burden of proof was reasonable because both the gov-
ernment and the non-consenting party would need only to show that the
primary purpose for the recording was or was not criminal under Title
111.109
In applying the primary motivation method to determine whether Waters
recorded the conversation for a criminal purpose, the Vest district court
stated that Waters wanted to make a record of the transaction between
himself and Vest."0 The district court also stated, however, that while
Waters might have made the recording to protect himself, Waters intended
primarily to use the tape to blackmail Vest."' The district court concluded
that because Congress designated blackmail as a crime under the criminal
purpose exception, the exception prevented the government from presenting
the tape recording as evidence against Vest."
2
The district court in Vest raised the problem of applying the criminal
purpose exception when an individual records conversations for many dif-
ferent purposes."' As a result of Congress' failure to consider the complexity
of human motivation in enacting the criminal, purpose exception, the Vest
court had difficulty in applying the criminal purpose exception." 4 The
107. Id.
108. Id. at 904-905; see supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing court's
rejection of two methods for determining criminal purpose that impose unreasonable burdens
of proof upon government and non-consenting party).
109. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904-905. The district court applied the primary motivation test
to the facts in Vest and determined that Waters' primary motivation for making the tape
recordings of the transaction between Waters and Vest was to use the recording to blackmail
Vest. Id. at 905-908; see supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing district court's
determination that Waters primarily intended to use tape recording for blackmail).
110. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 907.
111. Id. In Vest the district court found that Waters tried on many occasions to threaten
detectives in order to receive a light sentence for the crime of shooting a detective. Id. at 906.
112. Id. at 907-08 (stating that Congress intended blackmail to fall under criminal purpose
exception); see CONG. REc., supra note 9, at 14,694-95 (discussing crimes falling under the
criminal purpose exception); Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (provision stating tapes
made for criminal purpose are made in violation of Title III); id. at § 2515 (provision stating
that evidence produced in violation of Title III is inadmissible in any court); supra note 12
and accompanying text (discussing crimes Congress intended to fall under criminal purpose
exception).
113. See Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 902 (discussing lack of congressional guidance in applying
criminal purpose exception when individuals record conversations for many different purposes);
see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing lack of legal precedent and congressional
guidance in applying criminal purpose when individuals record conversations for many pur-
poses).
114. Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 902-904 (discussing district court's difficulty in applying criminal
purpose exception); see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' lack of
guidance for applying criminal purpose exception when individuals record conversations for
many purposes).
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language of the criminal purpose exception refers to a single criminal
purpose.' 5 Although people act for many reasons and motivations, 1 6 Con-
gress did not provide adequate guidance for courts to apply the criminal
purpose exception consistently when a recording is made for many pur-
poses.1"7
Courts can reduce the difficulty of applying the criminal purpose
exception by adopting the Vest court's primary motivation method to
determine whether a person recorded a conversation for a criminal pur-
pose." 8 The primary motivation method, which accounts for the complexity
of human motivation, allows a court to analyze all factors that comprise a
person's motivation in recording a conversation." 9 The primary motivation
method also places a reasonable burden of proof upon the government to
show whether a person recorded a conversation for a criminal purpose. 20
Finally, courts will encounter little difficulty in applying the primary mo-
tivation method because courts are familiar with the method and have
applied the primary motivation method to different types of circumstances. 12 1
115. Title III, supra note 7, at § 2511(2)(d) (criminal purpose exception provision); see
supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating language and purpose of criminal purpose
exception).
116. See Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904 (discussing that humans usually act with many different
purposes); id. at 907-913 (presenting difficulty in applying criminal purpose exception to
situation involving tape recording made for many different purposes).
117. See id. at 902-04 (discussing difficulty in applying criminal purpose exception resulting
from lack of congressional guidance); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Con-
gressional enactment of criminal purpose exception provision referring to single criminal
purpose); supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' failure to provide courts
with guidance in applying criminal purpose exception when individuals record conversations
for many different purposes).
118. See Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904-05 (discussing court's rationale in adopting primary
motivation method for determining criminal purpose); infra notes 119-121 and accompanying
text (discussing primary motivation method as useful method for determining criminal purpose
when individuals record conversations for many different purposes).
119. See Vest, 639 F. Supp at 904-05 (discussing court's contention that primary motivation
method accounts for an individual's mixed motives in recording conversations); see also
Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 9 (Ist Cir. 1980) (discussing court's adoption of
primary motivation method to determine whether employer fired employee for racially discrim-
inatory reasons although employer had many reasons for firing employee).
120. See Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 904-05 (discussing court's adoption of primary motivation
method for determining criminal purpose). To admit a recording under the primary motivation
method, the government need only show that an individual did not intend primarily to injure
a non-consenting party to the conversation. See id. at 904 (discussing court's reasoning that
primary motivation method places reasonable burden of proof upon government). To argue
that a recording is inadmissible under the primary motivation method, a non-consenting party
need only prove that a private individual intended primarily to injure the non-consenting party.
Id. (discussing Vest court's conclusion that primary motivation method places reasonable
burden of proof upon non-consenting party to demonstrate that individual recorded conver-
sation for criminal purpose); see supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing court's
rejection of two methods for determining criminal purpose that impose unreasonable burdens
of proof upon government and non-consenting party).
121. See Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 905-907 ( Vest court applies primary motivation test to
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Courts have had difficulty interpreting and applying the criminal purpose
exception.' 22 By carefully analyzing the legislative history of the criminal
purpose exception, courts will apply the criminal purpose exception to tape
recorded evidence when an individual records conversations with the criminal
purpose of intending to injure or offend a non-consenting party.' 23 In
determining whether a person recorded conversations for a criminal purpose,
courts should adopt the primary motivation method to apply properly the
exception to persons who record conversations for many purposes. 124 After
determining whether an individual recorded conversations for a criminal
purpose, courts only should exclude tape recorded evidence against non-
consenting parties under the criminal purpose exception1 25 By applying the
criminal purpose exception when a person records conversations intending
to injure or offend another individual, courts will apply the criminal purpose
exception properly, and will support Congress' purpose in enacting Title III
to protect non-consenting parties from invasions of privacy while combatting
organized crime.
26
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determine criminal purpose); Monteiro, 615 F.2d at 9 (First Circuit applies primary motivation
test to racial discrimination case); United States v. Phillips, 564 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1977)
(Eighth Circuit applies primary motivation test to case concerning public embarrassment);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985) (Supreme Court of
Delaware applies primary motivation test to determine whether directors of corporation
breached fiduciary duty of care).
122. See supra notes 20-52 and accompanying text (discussing Underhill court's difficulty
in applying criminal purpose exception); supra notes 84-109 and accompanying text (discussing
Vest court's difficulty in applying criminal purpose exception when individuals record conver-
sations for many different purposes).
123. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' definition of
criminal purpose as individual's intent to injure non-consenting party with tape recorded
evidence).
124. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of court adopting
primary motivation method in determining whether individual recorded conversation for
criminal purpose when individuals make recordings for many different purposes).
125. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for admitting
tape recorded evidence against individual who records conversation and not admitting tape
recorded evidence against non-consenting party).
126. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing court's support of Congress'
purposes for enacting Title III by admitting tape recorded evidence against individual who
records conversations for criminal purpose); supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' purpose of protecting non-consenting parties' privacy by enacting criminal purpose
exception); supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purpose of combatting
organized crime by enacting Title III to authorize law enforcement officials and individuals to
tape record organized crime members' conversations).
